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Abstract
In this study, we examine two types of aid transfers - boats and houses - that were made to
rehabilitate tsunami-affected fishery households in Sri Lanka.  Our goal is to investigate the
distributional impacts of these transfers and the effectiveness of targeting.  The study also attempts
to quantify the factors underlying the allocation of such asset transfers.  Data for this study comes
from the Census of Tsunami, conducted by the Department of Census and Statistics in 2005, and
a follow-up survey undertaken by us in 2008 for a sub-sample of fishery households.  Our
findings suggest that that there was better targeting of households with regard to the allocation of
houses than boats.  The findings also show that housing transfers resulted in improved asset
equality among fishery households compared to what existed in the pre-Tsunami period.  The
boat transfers on the other hand were not only poorly targeted but also increased asset inequality.
The findings of the study also reveal that households who had access to social networks were
more likely to receive aid transfers.  Apart from household characteristics, regional disparities
also played a role in the allocation of aid due to differences in access to infrastructure facilities,
political preferences or the presence and absence of political turmoil.  The findings of the study
highlight the importance of making a special effort to identify certain sub-sets of people such as
the very poor and marginalized groups, as well as households who lost human capital, when it
comes to targeting aid in disaster situations.
Key words: Aid targeting and distribution, Government policies, Social transfers, Post-disaster
development, Sri Lanka.
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Targeting and Distribution of Post-Tsunami Aid
in Sri Lanka: A Critical Appraisal
Asha Gunawardena and Kanchana Wickramasinghe
1. Introduction
Natural disasters are becoming an increasingly more prominent feature of the global landscape.
In recent years, the world has witnessed massive destruction due to natural disasters. The frequency
of occurrence and the economic impact of such disasters have been increasing from the 1970s
(CRED, 2008). South Asia in particular is highly susceptible to such natural disasters due to high
population density, high levels of poverty, and the heavy dependence on monsoonal rains. Floods,
wind storms, earthquakes, droughts and wave/surges including Tsunamis were the main types of
natural disasters that have created havoc in the region in the recent past. The number of recorded
natural disasters in the region from 1990-2007 were about 680, which resulted in some 400,000
human deaths and large numbers of people injured and displaced, in addition to the massive
losses economically (CRED 2008).
Development aid in terms of social transfers to the victims of the calamities plays a major role in
post-disaster situations of South Asian countries given their high vulnerability to such risks as well
as other factors such as their low-income levels. Recent studies have shown that the priority in
such situations should not only be on increasing the aid effort by raising and transferring more
money but on increasing aid effectiveness by targeting the right recipients (Mavrotas, 2009).
Very few studies to date have investigated post-disaster development aid in order to determine
how effective these interventions are in achieving the intended objectives.
Sri Lanka was one of the countries most affected by the Asian Tsunami that occurred on December
26, 2004, which resulted in more than 35,000 dead, over 20,000 injured, and  several hundred
thousand people displaced (GOSL 2005). This is also the largest natural disaster in the recorded
history of Sri Lanka. The loss of or damage to property was equally high. About 89,000 houses
were fully or partially damaged (DCS, 2005). The number of people who lost their livelihoods
amounted to 150,000. The fisheries sector was the most seriously affected economic sector.
The loss of lives among fishermen was estimated at 5000 with 71,500 households directly affected.
Fishermen lost about 16,000 crafts while roughly 7000 crafts were damaged due to the Tsunami
(Amarasinghe, 2006). The total property damage in the fisheries sector, including damage to
fisheries infrastructure, was estimated at US $391 million (ICSFW, 2005). In addition, many
coastal protection structures and coastal ecosystems were either disturbed or destroyed.
Following the Tsunami, Sri Lanka was fairly efficient and effective in providing immediate relief to
the victims. However, rehabilitation proved to be more challenging due to a variety of reasons.
The delivery of post-Tsunami interventions was not systematic and planned. Concerns have also
been raised about poor targeting and distributional issues (MFAR, 2006) in a context where
accurate pre-Tsunami information was not available. The situation was aggravated by poor
coordination among government agencies and local and international donors as well as local level
poor capacities with regard to receiving and distributing aid. This was compounded by the different
interests and priorities of donors.
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This study seeks to examine how well aid was transferred during the post-Tsunami period in Sri
Lanka. It focuses on two main social transfers: the transfer of houses and boats, as part of efforts
to rehabilitate Tsunami-affected fishery households in six districts of Sri Lanka. The study asks
three sets of questions: a) were households who received aid in the post-Tsunami period better-
off relative to the pre-Tsunami situation i.e. did aid improve the asset holdings of affected
households?  And, did aid transfers result in more equitable distribution of assets among households
or did they result in households becoming more un-equal i.e. what was the distributional impact
of such asset transfers on affected fishery households? b) how effective was aid targeting, i.e. did
households who lost assets due to the Tsunami receive aid or did aid go to the wrong recipients?
And c) what were the determinants of aid allocation at the household level.
The study draws its data from a census of Tsunami-affected households that was conducted just
after the Tsunami and a follow-up survey of a sample of Tsunami-affected fisher households
conducted in 2008. The study findings reveal that the targeting and allocation of housing aid was
better compared to boat aid. In addition, the distribution of houses in the post-Tsunami period
was also more equal when compared with the pre-Tsunami situation. On the other hand, the
distribution of boats was less equal resulting in small boat owners losing benefits they had previously
enjoyed while relatively big boat owners gained more expensive boats. However, it is interesting
to note that total asset (houses and boats) distribution among households in the post-Tsunami
period become more equal compared to the immediate pre-Tsunami situation.
We observe regional disparities in the allocation of aid. The findings of the study show that
access to social networks plays a significant role in receiving aid by households. Further, households
that experienced loss/death of, or injury to, a family member (members) were more likely to
allocated cheaper houses and were less likely to own boats in the post-Tsunami period, i.e. they
seem to be discriminated against in aid delivery. Thus, there is a need for donors to be alert to
special sub-sets of people in disaster situations and to make a special effort to reach them in their
aid transfers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the available literature on the
targeting of social of transfers. Section 3 describes the policies and programs on the distribution
of houses and boats in the post-Tsunami period. Section 4 discusses the study area, the data and
the data collection methods. Section 5 examines the distributional impact of asset transfers and
Section 6 investigates the effectiveness of the targeting of these asset transfers. Section 7 attempts
to examine the determinants of allocation of aid transfers. The final section concludes with policy
recommendations.
2. Targeting of Social Transfers
Targeting is the means by which to identify the potential members of a society who will receive
the particular benefits of a social transfer. There are two elements in targeting: setting the eligibility
criteria and establishing a mechanism by which to identify those individuals or households who
meet the eligibility criteria (Rachel et al, 2009).
The basic aim of any development aid within a country is improving the welfare of beneficiaries
and ultimately improving social and economic distribution within the community and society.
Targeting specific groups may be preferable to universal transfers for several reasons. Firstly,
most such interventions are provided by the government which is constrained by a limited budget.
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Thus, an efficient and effective use of the available budget while meeting the objectives of the
intervention is important (Coady et al., 2004; Basely & Kanbur, 1990). Secondly, universal
transfers can distort the local economy, for example, food-aid distribution can affect local food
prices and labour allocation (Jayne et al., 2002).
Targeting is also associated with costs. Improved targeting will likely incur administration costs
such as the costs of gathering information, conducting surveys and conducting means-testing of
households. In addition, the time taken for precision targeting will also be comparatively high.
Moreover, there will be private costs to the beneficiaries involved in receiving transfers. For
instance, in cases of “cash-for-work” programs where targeting is done through self-selection,
households have to bear the cost of foregone income opportunities, the opportunity cost of
queuing, and the cost of providing necessary documents to prove their eligibility (Coady et al.,
2004). Apart from private costs, there can be indirect costs as beneficiaries may change their
behavior in order to meet the eligibility criteria. Social stigma associated with being a beneficiary
is another fall-out that the beneficiaries may encounter within the community while there can be
political costs due to a reduction in social cohesion because the targeting of a particular group
may lead to resentment among non-targeted groups in the community against the recipients.
These costs imply that there could be a trade-off between targeting specific group of people and
reaching a high number of beneficiaries.
Researchers have come up with three main approaches to the targeting of social transfers: individual
or household level assessment, categorical targeting and self-selection. Individual or household
level assessment can be done in three different ways: mean testing, proxy mean testing, and
community based targeting (Coady et al., 2004). Mean testing compares the income or
expenditure of an individual or household with some threshold level. Proxy mean testing uses a
few indicators, such as certain household characteristics that are easy to observe, and develops
a score for each household on that basis. In case of community-based targeting, donors delegate
the authority to the community to select the beneficiaries. The second main approach, or categorical
targeting, happens when only individuals or households in a specific category are eligible to
receive intervention. Targeting based on region (geographical targeting) or demographic factors
such as age and sex can be included under this category. The third approach, or self-targeting,
provides universal eligibility with no administrative restrictions on participation but its design is
such that it encourages the more needy to participate because it factors in the differences between
the private cost of participation for the poor and wealthy households(Coady et al., 2004).
Examples are programs that involve low-quality subsidized food, queuing to obtain transfers, or
cash-for-work where the opportunity cost of participation is costly for wealthy households.
The targeting of aid for the purpose of social transfers is a challenging task while measuring the
performance of such programs is even more difficult. Barrett (2002) associates poor targeting
with mainly two kinds of problems: errors of exclusion (i.e., missing intended beneficiaries) and
errors of inclusion (i.e., providing benefits to the non-needy). For example, the Samurdhi Program,
which is the main poverty-alleviation program in Sri Lanka, is based on means testing (where the
beneficiaries are households that earn income below Rs.1500/= per month). But it misses 36%
of deserving beneficiaries while it includes 40% from higher income brackets (Goonasekara &
Gunatilake, 2005). Therefore, according to Barrett (2002), one approach to measuring the
performance of targeting is to compare the percentage of households under coverage due to
both errors of exclusion and leakage (that is, due to errors of inclusion). However, this approach
using the above two indicators has limitations such as its failure to account for more distributional
information and its focus on only the number of recipients but not the amount of transfers (Coady
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et al., 2004). In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of targeting by looking at errors of
exclusion in housing and boat transfers (see section 6 for further details).
It is useful to examine the factors influencing the targeting and allocation of aid to households.
But only a few studies are available to date on a multivariate household level analysis of the
targeting of social transfers. Galasso & Ravallion (2000) analyzed targeting and the distribution
of food-for-school programs in Bangaladesh and found that decentralized social programmes
are mildly pro–poor. They observed better targeting with in villages. In addition, they found that
the presence of local institutions such as cooperatives of farmers and landless appear to be
associated with pro-poor targeting while the presence of recreational clubs has opposite effect.
Jayne et al. (2002) on the other hand have examined the factors underlying the allocation of food
aid and the extent to which the food aid targets poor households and communities. They undertook
a multivariate household analysis using a comprehensive set of panel data from Ethiopia and
found that there was a spatial rigidity in food-aid distribution over time due to the fixed cost of
setting up operations, political lobbying by the recipients, and/or other reasons. They concluded
therefore that food aid had not reached the poorest households and communities in that region.
In Section 7 of this paper, we build on these two papers to examine the determinants of boat and
housing transfers in Sri Lanka.
The literature on targeting focuses largely on relief programs such as food aid, cash-for-work,
and food-for-work.  There are also studies on conditional programs such as cash for school
enrollment and regular attendance at health care programs.1 Our study, on the other hand, focuses
on asset transfers: housing and boats, for the purpose of rehabilitating Tsunami-affected fishery
households. These asset transfers aim at achieving long-term development among the affected
households. To date, there has been very little development literature on the targeting of asset
transfers, especially in post-disaster situations.
3. Policies and Programs on Housing and Boat Distribution in the
Post-Tsunami Period
There was a high level of interest from the government, multilateral donors, international and local
NGOs, and the local private sector in rehabilitating the affected people in the immediate aftermath
of the 2004 Tsunami. However, the rehabilitation of affected households posed a challenge due
to many reasons. First, there was little coordination and planning behind this interest and effort.
Different donors had different interests, budgets and time-constraints. For example, when it
came to replacing boats, providing small coastal boats was seen as an attractive quick fix as well
as a way to publicize their work for many NGOs and other donors who were under pressure to
distribute a large amount of funds within a short period of time (MFAR, 2006). The problem was
compounded by the absence of accurate reliable pre-Tsunami data as some of the information
available with village heads had also been washed away in the Tsunami waves. In case of the
1 Conditional cash transfers are currently popular and extensively used in several countries. These pro-
grams provide money to poor families, conditional on certain behaviors, such as compulsory school
enrollment of children and regular attendance at child-care services. Such programs are aimed at address-
ing not only short-term consumption needs but also long-term poverty reduction via human capital
accumulation through improvements in education, health and nutrition. Evidence from many countries
suggests that large efficiency gains (reducing leakages) can be achieved by improving targeting to poor
households and better calibration of conditional transfers as opposed to the universal uniform cash
transfers ( Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006).
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fisheries sector, the main problem had to do with the lack of information on the composition of
the fishing fleet and of fishery households, especially in the case of small scale fishers, due to the
informal nature of their vocation. Although the registration of boats was a legal requirement for
fishing, a majority of small-scale fishers had not registered and obtained licenses. Furthermore,
the lack of prior exposure to and thus experience of disasters of such magnitude and, hence, the
lack of capacity at local levels to deal with the contingencies arising from them made development
efforts more difficult.
Our field discussions with affected households revealed that a permanent house was the main
priority of affected people as a majority of them were living in temporary shelters. In March
2005, the government declared a no-build zone (which was meant to be a buffer zone) of 100m
in the southern and western provinces and 200m in the northern and eastern provinces. In addition,
the government introduced two approaches to providing housing assistance: the owner-driven
program for households that were located outside the buffer zone and the donor-driven program
for those that were located within the government-declared buffer zone. The government agreed
to provide grants and loans to those whose houses were fully (that is, more than 40% damage)2
or partially damaged and lived outside the declared buffer zone in order to rebuild their houses in
the same location. In order to qualify for the entitlement, the government required the households
to provide proof of ownership to the land on which they lived.
This policy did not permit families who lived within the buffer zone limit to rebuild their damaged
or destroyed houses. Thus they were to be provided with new houses built with donor assistance
on government land while allowing them to retain ownership of the original land. Nor did the
government require them to demonstrate ownership of the former land in order to qualify for
housing assistance. Guidelines were set by the Urban Development Authority (UDA) on the
floor size (a minimum 500 sqft) of the new houses and on the amenities that the houses would be
provided with such as electricity, drinking water, sanitation, drainage and access roads, etc. The
other feature of this policy was a “house for house”, according to which even extended families
were entitled to receive only one standard-sized house irrespective of how big their former house
had been (GOSL, 2005)
Unfortunately, the progress of the house construction and resettlement program has been slow
because of the unavailability of suitable lands close to the affected villages. This has forced
households who lived within the buffer zone to continue in temporary shelters for years. The slow
pace led the government to relax the buffer zone policy in 2006 along with a revised Tsunami
housing policy.  The revised housing policy refers to two zones3 based on the Coastal Management
Plan of 1997 of the Coast Conservation Department and aims at providing housing to all affected
households irrespective of whether they owned land formerly or not. In addition, the government
and other donors arrived at co-financing arrangements to build houses as the housing grant
provided through the government was inadequate. The government also introduced a system of
cash grants (IPS, 2006).
Most of the post-Tsunami livelihood programs focused on providing cash for work, the
replacement of assets (that is, boats and fishing tools), grants and loans to start a small business,
2 Housing grants given by the government were Rs 100,000 (USD 1000) for partially damaged houses and
Rs 250,000 (USD 2500) for fully damaged houses.
3 Zone 1 refers to state reservations within the Tsunami-affected coastal areas while Zone 2 refers to the
other areas.
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and alternative livelihood training programs. However, there were not many livelihood training
programs focusing on the fishery sector. Hence, only some fishery households in Trincomalee
received training on boat repairing. While the fishery sector lost a lot of physical assets, livelihood
programs confined themselves mainly to the provision of boats and fishing tools and did not
extend to the implementation of holistic livelihood restoration. Boat donations were mainly by
NGOs and poor coordination between the government and NGOs as well as the absence of an
accurate information system in the fishery sector made targeting more challenging (MFAR, 2006).
Moreover, unlike in the case of house transfers, there was no policy when it came to the targeting
and allocation of boats.
Two studies prior to the Tsunami have shown that the coastal fisheries sector in Sri Lanka has
reached the optimum level of exploitation and further exploitation would lead to over-exploitation
(Dayaratne, 1996; Wijeratne, 2001). These studies indicate therefore the necessity of controlling
the fishing effort and introducing proper management strategies in order to avoid the depletion of
stocks. However, the MFAR has not been successful in addressing these issues in a timely and
effective manner. This situation has worsened after the Tsunami because of the unplanned supply
of new coastal boats. MFAR suspects that the oversupply of boats/crafts through Tsunami
rehabilitation programs may result in an over-exploitation of coastal fisheries due to increased
fishing (MFAR, 2006). National-level data from the Boat Census conducted by MFAR in 2006/
2007 reveals that the total fishing fleet has increased by 35% in the post-Tsunami period when
compared with pre-Tsunami numbers (MFAR, 2008).
4. Study Area and Data
4.1 Data Collection
The 2004 Tsunami affected thirteen coastal districts in Sri Lanka (see Map 1). Of the thirteen
districts, 8 were more severely affected in terms of the extent of the impact on livelihood activities,
the extent of the damage to housing units, and the number of the injured and dead in households.
We thus choose to focus on those 8 districts. However, we decided to leave out the two districts
from the Northern Province because of difficulty in collecting data from these areas due to the
uncertain security situation that prevailed in northern Sri Lanka at the time of data collection. We
are thus left with 6 districts: Galle, Matara and Hambantota from the Southern Province and
Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Ampara from the Eastern Province4.
The study used the Tsunami Census conducted by the Department of Census and Statistics, Sri
Lanka, in 2005 as its source for baseline data. The Census had based its identification of
households for the survey on the housing damage that occurred due to the Tsunami. The Census
covered pre-Tsunami socio-economic conditions, the extent of damage to household members
(both deaths and injuries), and data on both the ownership of the pre-Tsunami house and other
assets as well as the damage to the house and other assets due to the Tsunami. In addition, we
used the Census of Fishing Boats conducted by the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
in 2006/2007 for purposes of cross-checking current boat ownership of households.
We also collected primary data using both quantitative and qualitative methods. We used data
from the Tsunami Census as baseline information in order to draw a stratified random sample of
4 Sri Lanka is divided into 9 provinces namely Southern, Northern, Eastern, Western, Central , North
Western , North Central, Uva and Sabaragamuwa
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fishery households which was 396 in number. We carried out a follow-up survey of the 396
fishery households in the selected 6 districts. As there are several Divisional Secretary’s Divisions
(DSDs) under each selected district, we decided on the number of DSDs to be surveyed based
on the percentage of affected fishery households that lived in each district. We listed the number
of DSDs from each district where more than 10% of the fishery households were affected. We
randomly selected the number of DSDs required for each district from this list. For each selected
DSD, we identified a list of Grama Niladari Divisions (GNDs) where there were more than 5%
affected fishery households. We then selected three Grama Niladhari Divisions (GNDs) from
each selected DSD. Table 2 shows the selected DSDs and GNDs from the 6 districts. The study
selected 39 GNDs from the 13 DSDs. Once again, we randomly selected ten fishery households
from each selected GND (see Table 1 for more details).
We collected data from the selected sample of fishery households with the use of a pre-tested
structured questionnaire (see Annexure 2). The questionnaire obtained post-Tsunami information
(that is, the situation that prevailed in 2008) on the fishery households such as their socio-economic
status, family information, home ownership and ownership of livelihood-related and other assets,
housing conditions, access to infrastructure, access to community-based organizations, and sources
and amount of various assets received as aid.5 In addition, we recalled data which were not
available in the Tsunami Census such as pre-Tsunami data on livelihood-related assets.
Two qualitative methods were employed in order to obtain an in-depth understanding of the
context and issues:
a) Key informant interviews: We conducted interviews with key informants such as relevant
government officials, fishery inspectors, Grama Niladhari,6 representatives of fishery
cooperatives, and officials of other relevant organizations in order to get a better
understanding of the issues related to the targeting of beneficiaries and problems related to
post tsunami reconstruction. We conducted these interviews in each of the six districts
during the first quarter of 2008.
b) Focus group discussions: We conducted nine focus group discussions in the selected
communities in the six districts chosen (see Table 1). Each focus group consisted of different
types of fishers (boat owners, crew members, etc.) and households who engaged in the
fish trade and other related services. Participants of the focus group were selected with an
eye to representativeness in terms of the major age groups (young, middle aged, old) and
socio-economic status. We utilized the information collected and knowledge gained from
in-depth interviews and focus group discussions in order to develop the structured
questionnaire for the household survey.
4.2 Construction of Variables: Calculation of Current and Pre-Tsunami
Asset Values
We used the guidelines of the Urban Development Authority (UDA) to calculate house values.
First, we classified houses as temporary or permanent based on materials used for construction
(i.e., wall, roof and floor materials). Then we calculated house values based on floor area, age of
the house and house type with the use of UDA guidelines (for further details, see Annexure 1).
5 However, we do not have information on the actual amount of housing aid received by each household.
6 Grama Niladhari is the official designation of the officer in charge of the village
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We calculated pre-Tsunami house values at current prices in order to adjust values against inflation.
We collected the current value of boats and the current value of the pre-Tsunami boats from our
household survey. In addition, we collected information on boat type and the year the household
bought or received the boat. We checked the boat values given by households against values
available from MFAR and private boat yards based on the boat type and the age of the boat.  We
assumed 5% boat depreciation for each year and the productive period of a boat as 15-20 years.7
We value both pre-Tsunami and current boats at 2008 prices in order to adjust against inflation.
4.3 House Reconstruction and Boat Replacement in the Sample
The following two subsections provide a description about the data obtained from the follow- up
survey of the tsunami affected households with reference to housing and boat assets.
4.3.1 Reconstruction of Houses
In our sample, 62 percent of the households had fully damaged houses while the rest of the
households had partially damaged houses. The majority (67 percent) of the households had
received housing aid through the government, followed by NGO-assisted households at 65 percent,
with 7 percent of receiving assistance from the private sector and community-based organizations.
It is important to note that most of the households had received housing aid from more than one
source. For example 45 percent of the households had received housing aid from both the
government and the NGOs. Among the 87 percent current house owners, 82 percent had been
able to obtain housing aid either from one or more than one source of aid (see Table 2).
By the year 2008, 51 percent of the households had been able to rebuild their houses on their
own land while 40 percent had relocated to new lands away from the sea. But around 6 percent
of the households had neither been able to rebuild their houses in the same land nor able to
relocate to another land. In contrast, around 3 percent of the households had not only been able
to rebuild their houses but also to receive a house on new land. However, it is important to note
that the percentage of households who live in permanent houses had increased from 65 percent
in the pre-Tsunami period to 83 percent in the post-Tsunami period. We also compared the
average value of their current house with the average value of their pre-Tsunami house (at current
prices) and found that the current average house value was more than double (see Table 2).
4.3.2Replacement of Boats
Forty six percent of households in our sample were boat owners in the pre-Tsunami period.
Thirty-nine percent of total households had lost their boats totally destroyed) while there was
partial damage to the boats of 6 percent due to the Tsunami wave. Only 1 percent of households
had escaped any boat damage (see Table 2).
The households had received boat aid primarily from local and international NGOs/donor agencies.
The percentage of households that received boat aid from the NGOs (local and international)
was 25 percent while only 5 percent received boat aid through the government. Another 1
percent of households received boat aid from either private or community-based organizations.
When we compared the average amount of boat aid received with the mean value of the destroyed
7 We assumed that there is no salvage value for this type of boat.
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boats, we found that the aid received was higher compared to the value of the destroyed boats
(see Table 2).
5. Did Asset Distribution Change with Post Tsunami Aid?
In this section, we attempt to investigate whether post Tsunami aid changed asset ownership
(houses and boats and both assets) with the use of cumulative distribution functions (CDF). The
CDF describes the probability that a real-valued random variable x with a given probability
distribution will be found at a value less than or equal to x. Then, we use Lorenz curves (LC) to
examine whether asset distribution has become more equal or vice versa. Lorenz curves are
normally used to measure income / wealth distribution. LC plots the percentage of total income
earned by various portions of the population when the population is ordered by the size of their
income (Gastwirth, 1971). In our paper we use the asset value instead of income. We also
estimate Gini-coefficients, another measure of income distribution.
5.1 Distribution of Houses
Two cumulative distribution curves on pre-Tsunami house values8 and current house values show
that except for a few households, a majority of the households now possess more expensive
houses9 compared to the pre-Tsunami situation (see Figure 1). For example, in the pre-tsunami
case, about 75% houses had a value of Rs 400000 or less, and after the reconstruction/ relocation,
the value of the houses went up so that only 30% houses have houses worth Rs 400000 or less.
Lorenz curves for pre-Tsunami and current house values show that the distribution of housing
assets in the post-Tsunami period has improved compared to the pre-Tsunami period. In Figure
5, the Lorenz curve for current house distribution is closer to the perfect distribution line (the 45
degree line) in comparison with the curve for pre-Tsunami house distribution. Another way to
look at asset distribution is by estimating the Gini-coefficient, which is the area between any given
LC and a LC for an economy in which  everyone has equal income, as expressed as the proportion
of the area under the curve for equal income distribution (Dorfman ,1979)10. In this paper, we
use asset values instead of income to calculate Gini coefficients. The Gini coefficients of the pre-
Tsunami and current house distribution are 0.5 and 0.43 respectively. Therefore, the distribution
of houses has become more equal after post tsunami aid.
5.2 Distribution of Boats
Figure 2 shows cumulative distribution curves plotted using the amount of boat aid received and
the current value of the destroyed boat. Figure 3 shows the current boat values and pre-Tsunami
boat values.11 Boat owners who owned less expensive boats before the Tsunami have lost out,
8 We calculate pre-Tsunami house values at current prices to adjust for inflation.
9 Due to limitations in the available data, we do not have details on the amount of housing aid received or
the damage value of the houses.  However, we attempt to compare current value of the pre-Tsunami house
and current house value as the majority of the current house owners have received housing aid (see Table
2).
10 Gini coeeficient  of income is usually calculated using the following equation
    where, n is the total units in the population and y is income. yi and yj are income of
individuals
11 We calculate pre-Tsunami boat values at current prices to adjust for inflation.
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while boat owners who owned more expensive boats had actually benefited due to post-Tsunami
boat aid.
The Lorenz curves that we plotted using the current value of the destroyed boat and the value of
boat aid received reveal that current boat distribution does not compare favorably with the pre-
Tsunami situation. The curve for boat aid received is placed well away from the perfect distribution
line (see Figure 6). The second Lorenz curve that we plotted for current boat value and pre-
Tsunami boat value show that these curves also follow a similar pattern 12(see Figure 7). The Gini
coefficients for the distribution of pre-Tsunami and current boats were 0.81 and 0.86 respectively.
The Lorenz curves further illustrate that current boat distribution is more unequal compared to
pre-tsunami boat distribution.
It is also interesting to note that total asset13 distribution among households has also improved
compared to the immediate pre-Tsunami situation (see figure 4) The Lorenz curves of current
value of pre-tsunami total assets and current total assets value shows that there is a more equitable
distribution of total assets (houses and boats) after post-Tsunami aid transfers (see figure 9).
6. How effective was Aid Targeting?
In general, development-related aid transfers at the individual or household levels basically target
the neediest. However, aid transfers in post-disaster Sri Lanka focused on wealthy and less
wealthy households, i.e. whoever owned their own houses and boats lost them either fully or
partially due to the disaster. Due to practical reasons aid programmes used pre-tsunami asset
ownership as a reference point in targeting. In this section, we attempt to investigate the
effectiveness of post-tsunami asset transfers with regard to targeting and allocation.
6.1 Housing Aid
In the case of housing, donors used two methods to replace damaged or destroyed houses.
Firstly, they based housing aid given for rebuilding on the severity of damage (whether fully or
partially damaged) and not on the amount or value of the damage. Second, they did not base
housing aid provided for relocated households on their previous house value or the damage
value. Instead, the government (GOSL) set guidelines on the minimum requirements for a standard
house for relocated households. Most of the relocated households were able to receive standard-
size permanent houses irrespective of whether the household concerned had occupied temporary
or semi-temporary houses in the immediate pre-Tsunami period
The reference point for targeting of house transfers was initially based on all pre-Tsunami house
owners affected by the Tsunami (that is, the policy of “house for house”) as mentioned in Section
3. However, this resulted in the exclusion of needy, poor and vulnerable household who did not
own houses pre-tsunami. Therefore, the government later changed the reference point for house
transfers to all Tsunami-affected households that did not own a house after the Tsunami devastation,
irrespective of whether they had owned a house during the immediate pre-Tsunami period or not.
12 We also plotted a Lorenz curve using the current boat value and the pre-Tsunami boat value (that is,
without taking into account the depreciation of boat values) in order to test whether boat distribution
follows the same pattern and to ensure that such distribution is not due to the provision of new and high
value boats (see Figure 8).
13 We calculated total asset value by adding house value and boat value.
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First, we cross tabulate the pre-Tsunami house ownership with current house ownership (see
table 3) to examine how house ownership has changed. Then, we cross tabulate the pre-Tsunami
house ownership against the recipients of the post Tsunami housing aid (see table 4) to examine
to what extent the government and donors have targeted the right households.
All the households in our sample experienced either fully or partially damage of their houses.
Ninety three per cent owned houses immediately before the Tsunami14. This percentage is lower
now with 87% of households currently owning houses.  Out of current house owners, 82% of the
households received housing aid15. According to the first reference point set by the government,
the error of exclusion is about 11% (93% to 82%). According to the second reference point, the
error of exclusion is about 18% (100% to 82%).  However, it is important to note that about 5%
of the total sample who built or repaired houses themselves are not actual needy. Therefore the
actual error of error of exclusion is about 13%.16
Among 13% of total households who do not own a house now, half were landless before the
Tsunami and have not been able to get housing aid.  This situation would have arisen from the two
initial housing-related policies of “no-build zone” and “house for house” as well as the relaxation
later of the same no-build zone policy which would have resulted in some poor landless households
losing potential ownership of a new house in a new location.  The rest had built temporary houses
on government lands or other lands which do not belong to them.
6.2 Boat Aid
We cross tabulate the pre-Tsunami boat ownership with the current boat ownership to examine
the changes of boat ownership. We also cross tabulate the pre-Tsunami boat ownership with the
recipients of post - Tsunami boat aid.
Boat ownership has changed from the pre-Tsunami period to the present. The percentage of
households who owned a boat (or boats) decreased from 46 percent (in the pre-Tsunami period)
to 38 percent. Only 59 percent of the pre-Tsunami boat owners own boats at present (see Table
5). Of the pre-Tsunami boat owners who lost boats, 48 percent received boat aid transfers.
Since boat transfers were said to target those who lost their boats, the exclusion rate (that is, the
proportion of households who should have received but have not received benefits) is 52 percent
(see Table 6 for more details). This also confirms claims by fishery households that among those
who received boats were households that a) did not have boats, b) that had boats which were
either not damaged or only partially damaged and c) in some cases, those that were not related
to the fishery sector at all.  Some of the pre-Tsunami boat owners who did not receive boats
have in fact had to change their occupations to become crew members of boats, laborers, fish
traders or masonry workers. Out of the number who did not own boats prior to the Tsunami, 20
percent currently own boats.17  These figures constitute evidence of poor targeting of boat aid.
14 Seven percent of the households did not own houses before the Tsunami.  They lived with either relatives
or friends or in temporary shelters on government reservations such as marine reserves.
15 Other 5% has built or repaired  houses on their own
16 We are not in a position to calculate the error of inclusion as our sample has only affected households in
terms of housing assets.
17 However, we cannot calculate the rate of inclusion as our sample includes only fishery households.
According to  our field investigations, the beneficiaries of boat aid are not only fishery households but
also many other households.
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7 What are the Determinants of Aid Transfers at Household level?
We examine the factors underlying the targeting and allocation of asset transfers (i.e., houses and
boats) at the household level. We use household level data to understand which household-
related characteristics made them eligible to receive post-Tsunami housing and boat aid.
7.1 Empirical models
We employ two models: Probit model to examine the determinants of allocation of aid (and
ownership of post-Tsunami assets)_among households and a Tobit model to explain the amount
of aid received (i.e., the money value of the house/boat) by each household and the determinants
of the allocation of such amounts. We carry out similar analysis for house and boat transfers.
7.1.1 Explaining Whether or Not Aid was Received Using Probit Models
Households either received aid or not and we seek to explain why some households received aid
and others did not. Given the nature of the dependant variable (which takes the value 1 if the
household got aid and 0 otherwise) we choose a Probit model18 to examine the probability of
households receiving aid transfers.
In this study we use two Probit models. First, we examine the probability of households receiving
aid transfers (houses or boats). In a second Probit estimation, we look at the probability of
households currently owning assets (houses and boats). We use the same dependent variables
as explanatory variables in both Probit estimations. The descriptive statistics on these variables
are presented in Table 2.
Pre-Tsunami asset ownership and the extent of damage to such assets were the main concerns
when it came to replacing assets as a means of rehabilitating affected households. Therefore, we
use pre-Tsunami asset ownership (that is, owning a house or owning a boat just before the
Tsunami) as an independent variable in order to examine whether aid transfers targeted the right
beneficiaries. In addition, we take certain characteristics of the household head such as gender
(male), ethnicity19, age and education levels (less than primary20, primary, secondary, etc.) as
independent variables in the analysis as they could have an impact on receiving assets or owning
them. For example, donors provided a considerable proportion of housing grants through the
government, which was, in turn, disbursed via the government banks. Thus, households who had
secondary level and above education would have found it easy to obtain these grants compared
to those without such education. Similarly, we hypothesize that the gender of the household head
matters. Men were more likely to have access to social networks than females. We also took
into account the age of the household as young households might have had more access to aid
through various social networks than older ones.
In addition, we hypothesize that the extent of damage to the family (that is, the death and/or injury
of family members due to the Tsunami) might also have influenced the receiving of aid. Our field
observations revealed that the families that experienced deaths, disappearances or disablement
18 Our results hold with other model specifications such as logit.
19 We had to drop the ethnicity variable as it is strongly correlated with districts/regions.
20 We take households with less than primary level education as the reference category.
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of members due to the Tsunami had focused less on obtaining aid and more on mourning for the
dead and the missing, organizing funeral rites for the dead and religious rituals on behalf of the
missing, or treating the injured members of the family. Since selecting genuine beneficiaries was a
challenge because of the lack of reliable information at the local level, some donor agencies
approached community-based organizations in order to identify beneficiaries. Therefore, we had
to consider the household’s access to social networks (that is, pre-Tsunami membership in a
community-based organization/s) as an independent variable. We also use regional dummies for
districts21 (Ampara, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Hambantota and Matara) in order to capture the
effects due to spatial variation.
7.1.2 Explaining the Amount of Aid Allocation using Tobit Models
We examine to what extent the values of destroyed/lost assets are compensated by aid transfers.22
Here we use a Tobit model with aid value received as the dependant variable. This model is
used to explain the amount of aid received as dependent variable. Tobit is used because the value
of the asset transfer is censored at 0 and negative values are not observable. As the minimum
value that can be observed is zero, we use several left-censored Tobit models to estimate the
determinants of the value of housing aid (re-built and re-located) and the value of boat aid
(amount of aid received and value of current boats owned).
We estimate a second left-censored Tobit model in order to examine to what extent households
recover in monetary terms the pre-Tsunami assets via the new assets. The independent variables
used are the same as the independent variables used in the previous section. We use the pre-
Tsunami asset value (that is, the current value of the destroyed asset) as an independent variable.
We use characteristics of the household head, the extent of damage to the family, the access to
social networks, and regional dummies as other independent variables.
7.2 Results
7.2.1 Houses
With the use of a Probit model, we first examine the factors that affect the households’ probability
of receiving housing aid.  Being a pre-Tsunami house owner increases the probability of receiving
housing aid by 0.77 while pre-Tsunami membership in a community-based organization increases
the probability of receiving housing aid by 0.09. In addition, we observe regional disparities in
aid allocation. For instance, compared to Galle, all other districts except Hambantota have a
lower probability of receiving housing aid (see model 1 in Table 7).
Next, we examine the probability of house ownership at present (in the year 2008) by using
another Probit model (see model 2 in Table 7). Owning a house before the Tsunami increases the
probability of owning a house at present by 0.79.  Being a pre-Tsunami member of a community-
based organization increases the probability of owning a house at present by 0.09. But being a
resident in Batticaloa reduces the probability of owning a house compared to Galle.
We next attempt to examine, with the use of a Tobit model, to what extent the value of housing
21 We consider households from the Galle district as the reference category.
22 We calculate the aid value received as the current value of the assets received in aid transfer.
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aid compensated for the damaged/destroyed house values.23 Calculating the marginal effects,
conditional on being censored, the results show that a one rupee increase in pre-Tsunami house
value resulted in a 0.21 rupee increase in the current house value (see model 3 of Table 7). As
mentioned in Section 3, donors provided housing aid in two ways: to rebuild houses on previously
owned land or to relocate to new land. Among rebuilt households, we observed a significant
positive relationship between their pre-Tsunami house value and their current re-built house
value (see model 4 in Table 7). A one rupee increase in the pre-Tsunami house value resulted in
an increase in current house value by 0.26 rupees. However, it is interesting to note that there is
no significant relationship between the current house value (re-located) and the pre-Tsunami
house value of relocated households (see model 5 of table 7). This was mainly due to the guidelines
set by the government for houses build in new locations (irrespective of the size/value of the pre-
tsunami damaged/destroyed house) to relocate households from their original land to another
land (see section 3 for further details) But being a member of a CBO in the pre-Tsunami period
was likely to increase the current house value for relocated households.
Households that experienced death, disappearance or injury of a family member (or family
members) were more likely to own less expensive houses at present. Compared to Galle,
households from Hambantota were more likely to own expensive houses. This is true for separate
analyses of both rebuilt and relocated households as well (see model 3 in Table 7).
7.2.2Boats
We use a Probit model to first examine the probability of receiving boat aid by pre-Tsunami
boat owners who had lost their boats (model 1 of Table 8). The results of the model show that
having a boat before the Tsunami increased the probability of receiving a new boat by only 0.26.
Being a member of a fishery cooperative (before the Tsunami) increases the probability of receiving
boat aid by 0.11. When compared with the Galle district, being a household from Batticaloa
increases the probability of receiving a boat by 0.16.
With the use of another Probit model, we examine the probability of current boat ownership
and pre-Tsunami boat ownership, controlling for other variables (see model 2 of Table 8 for
further details). Being a pre-Tsunami boat owner increases the probability of owning a boat at
present by 0.38.  Being a member of a fishery cooperative and being a household from Batticaloa
district increase the probability of owning a boat at present by 0.11 and 0.16 respectively.
Using a Tobit model, we examine the relationship between the amount of boat aid received and
the value of the destroyed boat in order to understand to what extent the destroyed boats were
compensated by the boat aid received. A one rupee increase in the value of the destroyed boat
increases the amount of the boat aid received by 0.42, rupees. Being a member of a fishery
cooperative before the Tsunami also increases the likelihood of receiving a more expensive boat
(see model 3 of Table 8).
Using another Tobit model (see model 4 of Table 8), we examine how pre-Tsunami assets
affected the value of current boats owned.  A one rupee increase in the pre-Tsunami boat value
resulted in an increase of 0.48 rupees in the current boat value. Being a member of a fishery
cooperative before the Tsunami increased the likelihood of owning a more expensive boat in the
post-Tsunami period.
23 However, we do not have actual amounts of housing aid received by each household.  Therefore, we
could compare the pre-Tsunami house values with current house values.
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8. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The study attempts to investigate the distributional impacts of house and boat transfers on Tsunami-
affected households. The study also examines the effectiveness of targeting of these asset transfers.
Further, the study attempts to examine the determinants of the allocation of aid at the household
level.
Our results reveal that the targeting and allocation of housing aid was better compared to boat
aid. In addition, the distribution of houses was also more equal when compared with the pre-
Tsunami situation despite a slight bias towards the homeless and the landless. On the other hand,
the distribution of boats was less equal resulting in small boat owners losing benefits they had
previously enjoyed in the process while relatively big boat owners gained more expensive boats.
The differences between the two aid transfers may be due to differences in the nature of the two
asset transfers, the availability of specific government policies, the availability of systematic
information, and the dominant mode of aid delivery. The nature of the two assets under study
was without doubt different: house transfers demand more planning and coordinated effort, putting
in place infrastructure and other facilities, and ensuring the long-time duration of the asset whereas
boat transfers do not demand as much. Moreover, it is comparatively easy to prove damages to
houses compared with boats.  Furthermore, while there was a government policy on the rebuilding
and relocation of houses, there was no specific and clear policy for boats. Local-level information
on fishermen and especially boat owners were not available, which made the selection of
beneficiaries for boat transfers more difficult compared to the selection of beneficiaries for house
transfers. In the case of house transfers, the government mainly administered the aid, followed by
local and international NGOs and other private or community-based organizations. In the case
of boat transfers, however, the main donors were NGOs.
The poor targeting of boat aid may have aggravated the rapid increase in the fishing fleet in Sri
Lanka. According to secondary data from the Boat Census conducted in 2006/2007, there was
already an oversupply of coastal boats in the pre-Tsunami period. Thus, cash transfers to enable
households to buy boats, or to invest in some other industry, may have prevented adding to the
oversupply, which has negative implications for ecosystems and the environment.
It is interesting to note that total asset24 distribution among households improved compared to
the immediate pre-Tsunami situation25. Therefore, we can conclude that there is a more equitable
distribution of total assets (houses and boats) after post-Tsunami aid transfers.
However, we observe regional disparities in the allocation of aid. In the case of housing aid,
southern districts such as Hambantota and Gallle have received more houses than other districts.
One explanation for this disparity might be their relative proximity to the center of power, that is,
the capital city of Colombo, compared to other districts and the better infrastructure facilities
such as roads which make access to the affected communities easier. Moreover, the districts
from the East were located closer to the centers of the ethnic conflict in the north and east, which
may have led to some donors steering away from these areas in their aid-distribution efforts.
This highlights the importance of the government making more coordinated efforts to target and
24 We calculated total asset value by adding house value and boat value.
25 See figures 4 and 9 for further details.
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allocate aid in less served areas as opposed to other areas that are less vulnerable to political
instability and where infrastructure and other facilities are available.
In both house and boat transfers, the aid was biased towards those who had access to social
networks such as community-based organizations. Most donors approached local community-
based organizations in order to identify potential beneficiaries due to a lack of local-level systematic
information about pre-Tsunami asset ownership. There could be both positive as well as negative
impacts arising from this approach. Our field visits reveal that in places where community-based
organizations were strong, the aid went to the right beneficiaries. In other areas, those who had
access to or link with officials of such community-based organizations were able to receive more
aid than those without such links. The findings of the study show that access to social networks
plays a significant role especially in the absence of local-level information. Therefore, donors and
the government should make a special effort to reach the marginalized and/or poor households
which usually do not have access to social networks.
Households that had experienced loss/death of, or injury to, a family member (members) were
more likely to own cheaper houses and were less likely to own boats. It is possible that they
concentrated more on looking for missing members or mourning their loss and/or treating the
injured, leaving them less time therefore to pay attention to requesting or receiving aid. In addition,
those who were very poor and/or marginalized were also less likely to receive housing aid although
this number was comparatively low. All this makes evident the importance of/need for donors to
be alert to these special sub-sets of people in disaster situations and to make a special effort to
reach them in their aid transfers.
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Table 1: Sample Selection for the Household Survey and Focus Group Discussions
District No of DS Divisions No of GNDs
No of Households
Selected
No of Focus group
Discussions
Galle 2 6 60 2
Matara 1 3 30 1
Hambantota 1 3 30 1
Batticaloa 4 12 120 2
Ampara 2 6 60 1
Trincomalee 3 9 90 2
Total 13 39 390 9
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Household Survey Data (n=396)
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev.
Housing Damage
Fully damaged 0.71 0.45
Partially damaged 0.29 0.45
Sources of Housing Aid 26
Through the government 0.64 0.48
NGOs/ Donors 0.63 0.48
Local private sector 0.03 0.16
Community-based organizations 0.03 0.16
Households' own contribution 0.05 0.32
Current Housing Situation
Rebuilt 0.51 0.50
Relocated 0.40 0.49
Rebuilt and relocated 0.03 0.17
Neither rebuilt  or relocated 0.06 0.23
Pre-Tsunami Housing Quality
Permanent 0.65 0.48
Temporary 0.28 0.45
Current Housing Quality
Permanent 0.83 0.38
Temporary 0.04 0.18
House Ownership
Current house owner 0.87 0.34
Pre-Tsunami house owner 0.93 0.25
Recipient of housing aid 0.82 0.38
House Values
Current house value 570088.2 487089.0
Pre-Tsunami house value 265555.1 250297.8
26 Most of the households had received housing aid from two sources, for example, from the government
and NGOs.
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Boats
Boat Damage
Fully damaged 0.39 0.49
Partially damaged 0.06 0.25
Not damaged 0.01 0.10
Did not own a boat 0.53 0.50
Sources of Boat Aid
Through the government 0.05
NGOs/ Donor agencies 0.25
Private or community-based organizations 0.01
Boat Ownership
Current boat owner 0.38 0.49
Pre-Tsunami boat owner 0.46 0.50
Recipient of boat aid 0.31 0.46
Pre-Tsunami boat owner if boat was destroyed 0.39 0.49
Boat Values
Current boat value 122444.20 381358.50
Pre-Tsunami boat value ( at current prices) 82595.96 197159.10
Amount of boat aid received 99703.03 362778.90
Current value of the destroyed boat 63498.33 168395.70
Household Characteristics
Gender of the Household Head (Male) 0.96 0.20
Age of the household head 45.42 12.24
Square of age 2212.6 1181.7
 Level of Education of the Household Head 27
= 1 if the household head has completed primary level of education but not secondary
level 0.19 0.39
= 1 if the household head has secondary or  more than a secondary level education 0.51 0.50
Damage to Household Members
=1 if the household experienced death of a family member due to Tsunami 0.12 0.33
=1 if a family member injured due to Tsunami 0.11 0.31
Households Access to Social Networks
=1 if head of the household was a member of a community-based organization before
Tsunami 0.64 0.48
=1 if head of the household was a member of a fishery cooperative  before Tsunami 0.53 0.50
27 We considered household heads with less than primary level education as the base.
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Yes No Total
Yes 339 30 369
(92% (8%) 93%
No 4 23 27
(15%) 85% 7%
Total 343
87%
53
13% 396
Table 3: Pre-Tsunami and Current House Ownership
Pearson chi2(1) = 128.8600   Pr = 0.000             Fisher’s exact =    0
Table 4: Pre-Tsunami house ownership and Housing Aid Received
Pearson chi2(1) = 99.15   Pr = 0.000             Fisher’s exact =    0
Current House Owner
Pre-Tsunami
House Owner
Housing Aid Received
Pre-Tsunami
House Owner
Yes No Total
Yes 322 47 369
(87%) (13%) 93%
No 3 24 27
(11%) (89%) 7%
Total 325
82%
71
18%
396
SANDEE Working Paper No. 55-10 23
Yes No Total
Yes 109 75 184
59% 41% 46%
No 42 170 212
20% 80.2% 54%
Total 151
38%
243
62%
396
Table 5: Changes in Boat Ownership ( pre-Tsunami and Current)
Current Boat Owner
Pre-Tsunami
Boat Owner
Pearson chi2(1) =  64.9099     P value = 0.000
Table 6: Boat Destroyed and Aid Received
Yes No Total
Yes 74 80 154
48% 52% 39%
No 49 193 242
20% 80% 61%
Total 123
31%
273
69%
396
Aid Received
Boat Destroyed
Pearson chi2(1) =  33.9765   Pr = 0.000
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Table 7: Results of the Empirical Models – Housing  (n=396)
Dependant Variable
Recipient of
Housing Aid
Current House
Ownership
Current House
Value 28
Current House
Value (Rebuilt
Households) 29
n=202
Current House
Value (Relocated
Households) 30
n=160
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Pre- house
Ownership
0.77***
(0.080)
0.79***
(0.080)
Pre-Tsunami Land
Ownership
0.046
(0.049)
0.054
(0.041)
Pre-Tsunami House
 Value 0.21*** 0.26** -0.06
Male
0.023
(0.096)
0.007
(0.073) -62092.18 -13626.41 -38389.61
Age
0.0003
(0.0087)
-0.003
(0.066) 6407.87 11412.90 8936.73
Primary Education
-0.1078
(0.073)
-0.012
(0.047) 7361.09 46899.37 -115707.33
Secondary &
Above Education
-0.017
(0.047)
0.026
(0.046) 21843.36 43608.76 -80151.37
Dead
-0.044
(0.064)
-0.036
(0.056) -91763.65* -63951.13 -48927.59
Injured
-0.009
(0.07)
-0.027
(0.062) -106732.57* -79131.96 -116795.73
Membership of a
CBO
0.087**
(0.041)
0.094**
(0.035) 42885.23 -19401.88 125790.72**
Matara
-0.348*
(0.203)
-0.286
(0.19) -160249.56 -215179.84** -115711.10
Hambantota
-0.217
(0.222)
-0.016
(0.146) 506936.60*** 572209.40*** 391730.37***
Trincomalee
-0.48**
(0.155)
-0.21
(0.135) -96125.44 -73841.76 -27244.44
Batticaloa
-0.327**
(0.137)
-0.247**
(0.115) 33050.4 17335.66 41055.65
Ampara
-0.484***
(0.169)
-0.26
(0.152) 28260.5 13306.14 -7554.69
***,**,* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively
28 53  left-censored observations at current house value<=0 and 343 uncensored observations
29 14  left-censored observations at current house value <=0 and 188 uncensored observations
30 21  left-censored observations at current house value <=0 and 139  uncensored observations
Probit  Model Tobit Model
Marginal Effects Marginal Effects at Observed Censoring Rate
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Table 8: Results of the Empirical Models – Boats (n=396)
Model 1 2 3 4
Dependant Variable Recipient of
Boat Aid
Current Boat
Ownership
Boat Aid Received
(Conditional on
Being Censored)
Current Boat Value 31
(Conditional on Being
Censored)
Pre-Tsunami Boat
Owner who lost Boat
0.26***
(0.05)
Pre-Tsunami Boat
Owner
0.38***
(0.05)
Current Value of the
Destroyed Boat 0.42***
Current Value of the
pre-Tsunami Boat 0.48***
Male
0.03
(0.13)
-0.06
(0.145) 33634.29 -27552.83
Age
0.00
(0.01)
-0.002
(0.014) -2945.09 -21.49
Primary
0.04
(0.08)
0.04
(0.086) 23575.58 31859.76
Secondary & Above
-0.12*
(0.06)
-0.09
(0.069) -58066.79 -43892.62
Dead
-0.08
(0.07)
-0.14**
0.06908 -41500.45 -39144.62
Injured
0.01
(0.08)
0.07
(0.088) 16377.38 34096.46
Member of a Fishery
Cooperative
0.11**
(0.05)
0.11*
(0.055) 55270.59* 48451.10*
Matara
0.03
(0.12)
0.08
(0.129) 47704.20 77188.18
Hambantota
-0.07
(0.10)
0.039
(0.1257) -5607.81 28382.76
Trincomalee
-0.08
(0.08)
0.05
(0.01) -38881.56 7943.31
Batticaloa
0.16*
(0.09)
0.16*
(0.092) 56355.24 47148.27
Ampara
-0.06
(0.09)
-0.025
(0.1055) -42123.13 -43819.98
***,**,* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively
Marginal Effects Marginal Effects
Probit Tobit
31 245 left-censored observations at current house value <=0 and 151 uncensored observations.
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Figure1: Tsunami affected Districts in Sri Lanka
Source : The Department of Census and Statistics  2005
Figure 2: Cumulative Distribution Curves for Pre-Tsunami32  and Current House Values
32 We calculate pre-Tsunami house value at current prices to adjust for inflation.
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Figure 3: Cumulative Distribution Curves for Value of Destroyed Boats and Boat Aid Received
Figure 4: Cumulative Distribution Curves for Current and Pre-Tsunami Boat Values33
33 We calculate pre-Tsunami boat value at current prices to adjust for inflation.
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Figure 5: Cumulative Distribution Curves for Pre-Tsunami Total Asset Value34 and Current
Total Asset Value35
34 We add up the value of the pre-Tsunami house and the value of the pre-Tsunami boat to calculate the total
pre-Tsunami asset value in pre-Tsunami period and at present.
35 We add up the value of the current house and the value of the current boat to calculate the total current
asset value in the pre-Tsunami period and at present.
Figure 6: Lorenz Curves for Pre-Tsunami (hv[2004]) and Current House Values (hv[2008]
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Figure 7: Lorenz Curves for Current Value of Destroyed Boat (bvd[2004]) and Boat Aid
Received (bvd[2008])
Figure 8: Lorenz Curves for Pre-Tsunami (bv[2004] ) and Current Boat Values(bv[2008])
30 SANDEE Working Paper No. 55-10
Figure 9: Lorenz Curves for Pre-Tsunami36 (bv[2004] ) and Current Boat Values (bv[2008])
36 Boat prices are not depreciated according to age of boats.
Figure 10: Lorenz Curves for Pre-Tsunami (2004) Total Asset Value and Current (2008) Total
Asset Value
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Valuation of Houses
The following section describes how the study valued houses.  However, these values may not
be the market prices of such houses.  The study calculates the total cost of building a house
based on indicators (data) from the baseline and follow-up survey. The actual price of such
houses may be different according to location, access to infrastructure, the distance to sea and
many other factors which the study has not taken into consideration.  We value both pre-Tsunami
and current houses at 2008 prices.
We valued the houses under two categories: pre-Tsunami houses and current houses.  We
performed the valuation of pre-Tsunami houses using secondary data that we obtained from the
Tsunami Census (i.e., the baseline survey) of the Department of Census and Statistics.  We
performed the valuation of the current houses with the same set of data from  the follow-up
sample survey.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1
Pre-Tsunami Current
Materials (Roof, floor, wall) Materials (Roof, floor, wall)
Floor area Floor area
Number of rooms Number of rooms
Age of the houses Year that house was rebuilt or relocated
We classified houses as permanent or temporary based on the materials used for the construction.
a, Valuation of Current Permanent  Houses
We used different price rates (Rs/ft2 ) based on the year that the households rebuilt or relocated
their houses.
Year Rate(Rs/ft2 )
2005 1000
2006 1100
2007 1300
2008 1500
(Source: Urban Development Authority)
b. Valuation of Current Temporary Houses
We performed the valuation of the temporary houses based on the floor area. We estimated
temporary houses with a floor area between 250-500 ft2 at SLRs. 40,000.  Houses with less
than 250 ft2 were valued at SLRs 20,000.  We valued houses with more than 500 ft2   floor area
at SLRs. 60,000.
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c. Valuation of Pre-Tsunami Permanent Houses
Since the Department of Census carried out their survey in 2005, they used Rs1000 /ft2 for the
valuation of permanent houses.  They also took into consideration the age of the houses in order
to get the depreciated values.
Age Category Depreciation
<10 20%
10-25 40%
25-50 60%
50-100 80%
>100 80%
d. Valuation of Pre-Tsunami Temporary Houses
We performed the valuation of temporary houses based on the age of the house.  Since 99% of
the houses were less than 500 ft2, we did not take the floor area into consideration.
Age Category Value(Rs)
<10 40,000
10-25 20,000
25-50 10,000
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